Recursive least squares learning is a central concept employed in selecting amongst competing outcomes of dynamic stochastic economic models. In employing least squares estimators, such learning relies on the assumption of a symmetric loss function defined over estimation errors. Within a statistical decision making context, this loss function can be understood as a second order approximation to a von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function. This paper considers instead the implications for adaptive learning of a third order approximation. The resulting asymmetry leads the estimator to put more weight on avoiding mistakes in one direction as opposed to the other. As a precaution against making a more costly mistake, a statistician biases his estimates in the less costly direction by an amount proportional to the variance of the estimate.
Introduction
Dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models can produce multiple outcomes depending on the equilibrium concept employed. For example, following Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) , models in which a central bank sets monetary policy over time when facing a public with rational expectations can deliver one of two outcomes. The Nash equilibrium concept delivers a time-consistent high inflation outcome, while the Ramsey equilibrium concept delivers a time-inconsistent low inflation outcome. Assuming that the central bank learns the latent parameters of the structural Phillips curve by estimating least squares regressions over the entire time series of data on a 'perceived' (and possibly misspecified) Phillips curve in order to set monetary policy, it is possible to state a stability condition whereby the Nash outcome is selected as the one that is 'learnable', and therefore expected to arise in reality. 1 On the other hand, if more weight is given to more recent data, Sargent (1999) and Cho et al (2002) have shown that an economy may occasionally 'escape'
for brief periods to the Ramsey outcome.
In this paper we ask whether information processing, modeled via statistical decision making, can enhance the learning dynamics obtained in the constant gain case. In particular,
we model the information processing decision separately from the optimal policy-making decision. This dichotomy allows us to incorporate alternate assumptions on information processing. Consequently, any contributions to the dynamics of learning that alternative assumptions provide can be explicitly identified. In order to motivate this approach it is instructive to view the adaptive learning process through a statistical decision making lens, as follows.
Adaptive learning begins from the assumption of least squares estimation. Least squares estimation assumes, following Zellner (1971) and Berger (1985) , that a statistical decision maker minimizes a squared error loss function, faces an underlying data generating process that is Gaussian in nature and employs Bayes' rule to update parameter estimates as new 1 See Honkapohja (1999, 2001 Suppose that the SDM views overestimation of the unknown parameters as more costly than underestimation. A third-order approximation to the underlying utility function is necessary for this assumption to affect the SDM's actions. This paper first demonstrates that such a SDM would have an asymmetric loss function, derived by taking a third-order approximation to the underlying utility function. The asymmetry will then cause the SDM to behave in a 'precautionary' manner. Indeed, the mathematics underlying this interpretation of the asymmetry is essentially the same as in Leland's (1968) study of precautionary saving.
Given an asymmetric loss function, this paper specifies the recursive form of the optimal estimator chosen by a precautionary SDM. 
Precautionary Motives in Statistical Decisions

The Standard Case
Following Berger (1985) , a SDM faces the following problem when deciding upon the loss function upon which to base estimation. Given a set of states of nature or parameters e θ ∈ Θ, the decision maker takes an action e a ∈ e A in order to maximize utility (g) which is a function of the estimation error ( e θ − e a). Assuming that g is strictly concave and thrice continuously differentiable yields the following Taylor series approximation of g( e θ−e a) around 0:
where g 1 denotes the first derivative and so on. Next, define the following expectations:
Given this environment, Berger (1985) defines the loss function for estimation as,
which, given re-definition of the action space as e A * = {e a − c, c =
Given this symmetric loss function, optimality of the least squares estimator is assured.
The Precautionary Case
If the SDM has a precautionary motive then a third-order approximation of the utility function is required to account for this motive. We assume that the SDM seeks to maximize utility E[g(λ(e a − e θ)] where λ is a scale parameter that measures how sensitive the decision maker is to deviations of e a from e θ. Define the loss function to be
Under the assumption that g is differentiable to the fourth degree with respect to e a − e θ, a Taylor series approximation is
We wish the optimal objective for the statistical decision-maker to be to choose e a = e θ, which implies the conditions E[g 1 (0)] = 0 and E[g 11 (0)] < 0 so that e a = e θ is the local minimum of the loss function. It can further be assumed that E[g(0)] = 0 since a constant can be added to the utility function without changing the underlying structure. Next, define
then the loss function simplifies to
Further, assuming as in the standard case, that the statistical decision-maker chooses e a to minimize E θ [L( e θ, e a)] (given beliefs about the distribution of e θ), the first order condition reduces to
where
Assuming that the optimal e a follows e a = e a 0 + λe a 1 + λ 2 e a 2 + ...,
then to the zero-th order in λ
and to first order in λ
Dropping the second and higher order terms in λ one can compute
In particular, with respect to estimation problems, we assume that the loss function takes the following LINEX form,
Thus,
and,
This discussion is applied to the adaptive least squares learning process described below.
The Economic Environment
Cho et al (2002) describe a model in which the monetary authority uses least squares learning to determine its policy. The monetary authority's beliefs are described by a vector of regression coefficients e γ. It chooses a decision rule h(e γ) that causes the stochastic process for the economy to be e ξ(e γ). Given e ξ(e γ) the best fitting regression will be Γ = T (e γ). A self-confirming equilibrium is a fixed point of T .
Here we consider what happens if we separate the monetary authority into two entities:
a statistician and a policy maker. The statistician's beliefs are described by a vector of regression coefficients e γ. Based on those regression coefficients, the statistician estimates b φ(e γ) where φ is the object of interest to the policy maker, which in turn summarizes the beliefs of the policy maker about the economy. The policy maker then follows a decision rule H(φ) that causes the stochastic process for the economy to be e ξ(H). Finally, given e ξ, the best fitting regression by the statistician in the next period will be Γ( e ξ). If we define
T (e γ) = Γ( e ξ(H( b φ(e γ))) then a self confirming equilibrium is a fixed point of T .
Suppose that the statisticians goal is to minimize a loss function L( b φ − φ) and a is a scalar that measures the degree of precaution in reporting estimates to the policy maker, where a = 0 implies no such precautionary motive. Then the estimated function of interest is b φ(γ|a) and will be a function of a. In the event that a = 0 the statistician and policy maker coincide and there is no dichotomy.
The Basic Model
As an example of how the dichotomy between a policy maker and a loss averse statistician might interact, we consider the following model of inflation and unemployment adapted from Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Cho et al (2002) . Let U t represent unemployment and π t represent inflation. The monetary authority chooses its target inflation rate x t to minimize the loss function
where U t is governed by
and
where (σ 1 , σ 2 ) > 0, and (W 1t , W 2t ) T are i.i.d. normally distributed shocks with zero means and identity covariance matrices. In the Phillips curve above, b x t is the private sector's expectation of inflation at t, u > 0 is the natural rate of unemployment and θ > 0 is the slope.
Let us suppose that the monetary authority takes b x t as given. Then, given the above loss minimization problem,
is the optimal inflation target. Under rational expectations, x t = b x t , so the optimal policy is x * t = αθu. This corresponds to the time-consistent Nash equilibrium of Kydland and Prescott (1977) . Thus, in equilibrium, E[U t ] = u and E[π t ] = αθu and
On the other hand, if the monetary authority did not try to exploit the private sector's expectations and just assumed the private sector would know what it was doing, then the enlightened policy maker's loss function is
where b x t is set equal to x t . Then clearly, the optimal policy is x t = 0, so E[U t ] = u and
This corresponds to the time-inconsistent Ramsey policy of Kydland and Prescott (1977) .
This is the optimal policy, but it is not supportable over time because the monetary authority has an incentive to inflate to get a lower unemployment rate, so there is an inflationary bias.
Least Squares Learning
Adaptive least squares learning begins by first assuming that the monetary authority has a perceived law of motion (PLM)
while the actual law of motion (ALM) is given by
where we have assumed rational expectations on the part of the public and, as before,
Suppose now that the policy maker determines policy by minimizing the loss function
where the expectation is determined by the PLM. Then
which has the first-order condition
Thus, the monetary authority will follow the policy
Plugging the monetary authority's policy into the ALM, we get the system of equations
In a self-confirming equilibrium, the policy will be chosen so the ALM (35) and the PLM (28) are the same. Thus,
This system has the solution
Note that in the self-confirming equilibrium,
which is the same high-inflation but time-consistent policy pursued by the fully rational monetary authority.
The idea is that if the ALM can be learned via least squares, the monetary authority will converge to a high-inflation policy. The question of this paper is whether introducing precautionary motives into the learning process can affect the dynamics of reaching the high-inflation policy.
Precautionary Learning
Suppose the policy maker is assumed to myopically set policy so as to minimize the loss function specified above and the private sector has rational expectations so b x t = x t . As before, the monetary authority models the economy with a linear Phillips curve such that U t is a linear projection on π t and the information available at t.
Let us assume that the statistician estimates the PLM
where ω is a scalar, u 0 is a constant, and η t is a mean-zero, serially uncorrelated noise term.
Let us suppose the statistician is particularly interested in knowing ω and also suppose that the statistician is more concerned about overestimating ω rather than underestimating it.
As a result, the statistician chooses its estimate b ω so as to minimize the LINEX loss function
If the statistician believes at t that ω ∼ N(μ
and the optimal estimate will satisfy
Thus, if a > 0, it is more costly for the statistician to underestimate ω than to overestimate ω, so he makes a higher, more conservative estimate than he would if he had a quadratic loss function (corresponding to a = 0). The opposite is true if a < 0.
The statistician will use the Kalman filter to update his estimate of ω in the perceived Phillips curve to b ω t . Then the policy maker will choose x t so as to minimize
This simplifies to
since the policy maker believes that both W 2t and η t are mean zero. The variance-covariance matrix of W 2t and η t does not affect the policy makers decision since the last term is independent of x t . The policy maker will choose x t to satisfy the first-order condition
Thus, the optimal choice will be
Given the statistician's underlying precautionary motives and his beliefs, this is
Using Evans and Honkapohja (2001)'s Ricatti equations, which do not involve the esti-mate of the error variance (but also require the inversion of a matrix), we have
where in the present context y t = u t , x t = (1, π t ) T , ξ represents the recursive parameter estimate (e.g. the slope of the Phillips curve). For constant gain learning, we replace t
by γ −1 , where γ is a constant. Effectively, the learner will behave as though he is considers only a moving window of the last γ observations.
The estimate of the variance-covariance matrix will then be 
is a 1 × r row vector that satisfies the Ricatti equation
Generalizing, we then get the precautionary learning equation
where i = 1, . . . , r and ξ consists as before of the regression parameters estimated by the SDM and provided to the policy-maker. We now provide simulation results of the model to evaluate whether the low inflation outcome is reachable. 2 In the simulation results we let γ −1 be the constant Kalman gain of the Ricatti equations as in Cho et al (2002) and vary that as well.
Simulation Results
Our first objective in simulating the model economy is to verify whether or not we obtain escape dynamics given a lack of precaution (in order to replicate the results, for instance, in Table 1 and were conducted for 10000 periods. Given the fixed parameter values, Nash inflation is 10% and Ramsey inflation is 0%. Next, Table 2 provides the values for the parameters that are varied and indicates the time series for the targeted rate of inflation (x t ) that arise given the varied model parameters. These time series are then plotted in Figures 1-4 . Given these simulations for varying degrees of precaution, one might wish to ascertain what is the optimal level of precaution for the statistician to exhibit. Table 3 provides the average value of the loss function for each of the 16 simulations. What is clear from Table 3 is that introduction of the precautionary parameter leads to lower values of the loss function being optimized by the policy-maker, relative to the no precaution case, when γ −1 = 20. For γ −1 = 100 this is not necessarily the case. Next, the lowest level of the loss occurs for the targeted inflation series X 9 which corresponds to the a = 6 'medium' level of the precautionary parameter. As per the first panel in Figure 3 this is the case in which inflation fluctuates closely around the Ramsey outcome. In summary, it is entirely feasible that for certain values of the precautionary parameter the loss experienced by the monetary authority may be lower and the authority might still consistently target inflation around the Ramsey outcome.
The adaptive learning approach is a rich environment in which stability, perturbation, and other issues can be analyzed with respect to models with multiple possible outcomes.
In this paper the approach has been to analyze learning dynamics in the event that a policy maker is split into the usual economic decision maker and into a statistical decision maker who exhibits a degree of precaution in forming estimates of the Phillips curve. In simulation we can show that we do obtain learning dynamics that are rich enough to warrant further analytical investigation. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any method by which stochastic approximation can be conducted for the constant gain case under precaution, so we limit our analysis to presenting the simulation results. These results suggest a possible tension between the pull of time-consistency and the degree to which a statistical decision maker is cautious about interpreting information (reflected in the estimator employed). We show that in simulation it is possible that the targeted rate of inflation tends to the Ramsey outcome and may stay there for some time.
